A T a conference held in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997, the Parties to the a-A UN Framework Convention on Climate Change agreed to a Protocol to .X -ÄLreduce global greenhouse emissions. Although heralded by many as a breakthrough in climate change policy, the Protocol is fundamentally Hawed and in its current form will probably collapse if adopted. Its flaw is that the main focus is on achieving rigid 'targets and timetables' for emissions reductions at any cost rather than on substantial reductions in emissions at reasonable cost.
emission trading permits or umbrella groupings of permit traders as a way to im plement die Protocol. Unfortunately, while die advantages of a permit trading sys tem at die domestic level is well established dirough other emissions trading schemes (such as the US sulphur dioxide scheme), and the global schemes seem theoredcally sound, few researchers have understood the adjustment problems in volved in implemendng such a proposal.
McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1997a, b) point out diat a global emission permit trading system with caps on die number of permits (diat is to say, an explicit and binding emission target) is a dangerous path to take because, under some scenarios for die evoludon of die global economy, the Protocol may be abandoned because of economic and polidcal problems oudined below. In an attempt to overcome die potendal flaws in diis scheme, we have pro posed an altemadve policy diat would achieve real greenhouse gas reducdons with out die potentially disruptive political and economic problems of a global permit trading scheme diat is built around fixed targets and timetables. This is a globally coordinated system of domestically implemented permit trading schemes widi a fixed common permit price across all countries. Richard Cooper (1996) has called diis an 'agreed actions' radier dian an 'agreed targets' approach. The idea is to pro duce a system diat falls between die extremes of rigid targets and inaction on climate change policy.
How Do Permit Systems Work?
The basic idea behind a tradeable permit system is simple. Any firm emitting car bon dioxide (or the carbon dioxide equivalent of a broader range of gases) would be required to own permits equal to die amount of carbon it produces. For example, a firm emitting 100 tons of carbon would have to own 100 permits. The permits would be allocated among countries by treaty, and each government would decide how to distribute its permits domestically. Once distributed, the permits could be bought and sold widiout restriction on a world market. It would be illegal to burn fossil fuels widiout having purchased a permit, and it would be up to each govern ment to enforce die treaty widiin its own borders.
Permit systems have three key features as a mediod of pollution control. First, they provide a firm upper bound on emissions. This feature makes permits attrac tive to diose who believe diat decisive action needs to be taken on climate change.
Second, because die permits can be traded, pollution abatement will occur at the minimum possible cost to the economy. Firms diat can clean up cheaply will carry out die abatement: they will be able to make a profit by cutting dieir emis- sions and selling their surplus permits. Firms that find it very expensive to reduce emissions will buy permits instead.
Third, permits will ensure that die marginal cost of reducing carbon emissions is die same in all countries that participate in die scheme. In other words it would cost die same to remove a unit of carbon from each country participadng, so no lower-cost opdons will remain.
If a global permit system were implemented following die Kyoto Protocol, countries would presumably be allocated an inidal stock of permits equal to their targets. For example, Australia would receive permits equal to 108 per cent of 1990 emissions whereas the United States would receive permits equal to 93 per cent. These would be allocated widiin countries, and finns could trade widi one anodier in a global market. Given diat the marginal abatement costs (the incremental cost of reducing emissions) are estimated to differ across countries, die permit price would be somewhere between die lowest and die highest marginal abatement costs.
A global permit trading scheme appears to be a very attractive way to imple ment die Kyoto Protocol. It performs well when run dirough global models under multiple scenarios, and clearly minimises abatement costs in die longer run. How ever, a number of potential problems can be identified that are related to die nature of die adjustment padi radier dian die long run.
What Could Go Wrong in Practice?
Permit systems have worked well when used to control domestic environmental problems. Idle best-known example is die sulphur emissions trading scheme intro duced by the 1990 amendments to die United States Clean Air Act. It has been a tremendous success: electric utilities, die principal industry affected by die pro gramme, have been able to reduce die cost of controlling sulphur emissions to onetendi of die minimum cost projected when die act was adopted. For controlling carbon dioxide emissions in an international context, however, several practical problems arise diat ensure dial a treaty based on an international permit trading scheme would be very difficult to ratify or implement in die US.
A fundamental problem widi a conventional global permit system widi a fixed supply of permits is diat it could generate large transfers of wealdi between coun tries. This is not likely to be a problem for a system including only die developed Annex I countries. But it becomes a more serious potential issue when the system is expanded to include die major developing countries. Supporters of a permit sys tem regard the wealdi-transfer properties of the permit scheme as an advantage be cause it would allow developed countries to compensate developing countries for reducing dieir emissions. This would be a significant political problem for the US Congress. But, more important, it could put enormous stress on die world trade system. The balance of trade for a developed country importing permits would deteriorate substantially. This would lead to substantial volatility in exchange rates and distortions in the world trade system. Equally serious problems would be cre-
See ABARE (1997) and McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1997c).
ated for developing countries. Massive exports of permits would lead to exchange rate appreciation and a decline or collapse in exports other than permits.
Another problem is that the permit revenue for developing countries comes with strings attached: much of it would have to be invested in improved energy technology in order to reduce emissions and free up the permits in die first place. This is unlikely to be an ideal strategy for long-term economic development and would make the policy unattractive to developing countries.
In fact, developing countries have been so unendiusiastic about die policy diat the Kyoto meeting produced support for an umbrella group to trade emission permits (including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, Russia, Ukraine and die US). However, diis is a compromise that significandy weakens the main reason for having internationally tradeable permits: die potendal gain from trade in emissions rights between industrialised and developing countries. Permit trading would do litde to lower abatement costs when the participating countries have fairly similar marginal abatement costs. Moreover, diis umbrella system may not even reduce emissions, because Russia and die Ukraine are well below their 1990 emission lev els and would be able to sell dieir unused permits widiin die umbrella group. In that case, die permit system would really amount to nothing more dian an elaborate accounting mechanism for counting increases in emissions in countries like the US against die 1990 allocadon for Russia; diere would be litde or no overall reducdon. But under a plausible alternative scenario in which Russia grows strongly between now and 2008, die demand for permits widiin Russia would increase, sharply driv ing up die umbrella price of permits. This could add an ironic twist to an interna tional permit policy: if Russia were to grow quickly, die US could soon become the developed world's low-cost emissions abater. In diat case, die US would be a net seller of permits, and die rest of die industrial world would end up paying it to re duce its emissions. Under die scenario oudined, diis is exacdy die outcome that efficiency would dictate; but it would be polidcally fatal to die Kyoto Protocol in the US. Most important, serious greenhouse abatement will only occur in a system diat includes developing countries. Whatever emerges from post-Kyoto negotiadons should have diis as die paramount objective.
Anodier problem widi die Kyoto Protocol and any conventional permit trading system under a fixed target is diat no individual government would have any incendve to police die agreement. It is easy to see why diis is so: monitoring polluters is expensive, and punishing violators imposes costs on domestic residents in exchange for benefits diat will accrue largely to foreigners. Governments would be strongly tempted to ignore firms exceeding dieir emissions permits. For die treaty to be vi able, however, each pardcipadng country would need to be confident diat all of the other pardcipants were enforcing it. It is clear diat such a system would require an elaborate and expensive international mechanism for monitoring and enforcement.
A final problem is diat die supply of permits would be from each country par dcipadng and hence any country that cheats on die system will potentially under mine the value of permits for die entire system. Once the value of permits becomes highly uncertain, die system is vulnerable to collapse. To see diis, consider the case of government bonds issued by different countries. These are essentially the same instruments, but each is priced differendy in world markets purely because govern ment bonds are issued by different governments. Thus, different sovereign risks are priced into government bonds from different countries precisely because there are different degrees of uncertainty about the ability of governments to honour diese assets. Now consider die potential disrupdon to global bond markets if all countries were able to issue exaedy die same bond diat was redeemable in any odier country. The system would be vulnerable to collapse if one country behaved inap propriately and undermined the value of all government debts. Thus, a world permit system widi a fixed supply of permits and a variable permit price would be very difficult to hold togedier because it would require enforcement procedures and a rule of law that currendy do not exist at die global level.
All in all, an internadonal permit system aimed at a fixed target for greenhouse emissions is unlikely to be polidcally viable in developed countries, could distort or compromise die world trade system, would be unattraedve to developing countries, and would be difficult to monitor and enforce. It is an impracdcal policy focused on achieving an unrealisdc goal.
An Alternative to Fixed Targets
McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1997a, b) have advocated a policy diat gets around the potendal problems of a global permit trading scheme discussed above. This a sys tem of internationally coordinated but domesdcally administered permit trading systems widi a fixed price in each system. In many ways our approach seerns like a small movement away from the global permit scheme widi a fixed quandty of per mits, which retains many of die advantages but removes crucial problems. Despite die apparent similarities, our approach is philosophically far removed from die de gree of centralisadon implicit in a global permit scheme, which has very different political implicadons. Our proposal, as originally designed, is an internadonally coordinated system of nadonal permits and emissions fees for carbon dioxide, al though it could easily be extended to incorporate die six greenhouse gases idendfied in die Kyoto Protocol. Under diis system, all emitters would be required to own permits equal to dieir total emissions of diese gases.
There would be two stages of permit distribudon. In die first stage, countries would be allowed to distribute a specified number of permits to dieir domesdc emitters in any way diey liked, including handing diem out for free. To minimise administrative costs, die permits would be based on the emission of carbon at die original source of energy such as the coal mine and oil and gas extraction industries. Although this is where the permit is required, these producers do not bear the full burden of the cost, since this will be passed through die production and consump tion chains widi some portion of die permit price being reflected in die final price to end users of carbon-intensive products.
The key to our system is diat, radier dian allow permit trading to set die market price, die price of permits will be fixed by international agreement. The market trading will dien determine where abatement occurs, but at die fixed price. We propose a fixed permit price of US$10 a ton of carbon, because diis is well below die price diat most models estimate a stabilising permit price would be. So at die fixed price, diere will be an excess demand for permits. Once a firm receives an initial allocation of permits from its government, die firm will have to decide whedier to buy additional permits, sell some of its allocation, or stay widi exacdy the number it was given. If it does not buy or sell permits, it can continue widi its exist ing practices at no additional cost (although diere is a significant opportunity cost from not selling permits). If it needs to increase its carbon-emitting activities, how ever, it will have to buy additional permits at a price of US$10 a ton, giving it a clear incentive to avoid increases in emissions. At die same time, if die firm could re duce its emissions, die permit system would give it a strong incentive to do so: avoided emissions could be sold on die permit market at a price of $10 a ton. For example, if an electric utility could shift some of its load from coal to natural gas for a cost of $6 a ton of carbon, it could emit less carbon and make a profit of $4 a ton by selling its excess permits. Indeed, many firms have claimed diey are willing to undertake low-cost carbon abatement. The permit system we propose will reward firms for diese endeavours. The more effort a firm puts into reducing carbon emitting activities at low cost, die higher its profits will be.
Alter diese permits are allocated within each country an unlimited number of additional permits could be purchased from each government by domestically lo cated emitters at a stipulated international price of US$10 a ton. Thus, die price is held by governments being willing to sell additional permits to satisfy die excess demand emerging from permit trading among domestically located firms. Because the total number of permits can rise if abatement turns out to be expensive, the policy has safeguards diat would limit die economic damage diat die policy could inflict. Yet we have chosen a price which most studies estimate will generate a de mand for permits in excess of die initial allocation (this could be based on 1990 emissions or die Kyoto targets but would be negotiated).
Since die policy does not focus on achieving a specified target at any cost (indeed die cost is known widi certainly), such a system would be far more likely to be ratified, and by more countries. This policy is not simply a uniform carbon tax, as it is often portrayed. Only marginal emissions above die target are subject to a direct charge (die price of permits); but most of this is a transfer within industry rather dian between industry and government. Indeed, existing emitters are implicidy given subsidies to change dieir behaviour because die opportunity cost of con tinuing with dieir activities is die permit price. If firms do nodiing, they are not subject to any direct cost increase but are awarded profit in proportion to their suc cess at reducing emissions.
Although at first sight it appears that existing industry and new industry are treated differently, diis is not die case. Existing emitters would experience a decline in die value of capital. They will have to change dieir capital stock over dine. These existing emitters receive lump-sum compensation for die change in die value of exisdng capital stock diat die permit system would cause. This compensadon is proportional to die amount of abatement achieved. A unit of carbon emitted will cost bodi new and exisdng firms die same because new firms must buy the permit, but exisdng firms must decide whedier to keep die permit at die cost of die permit price or to reduce emissions. Eidier way, die permit price will affect the costs of the two types of firms in exacdy die same way.
In principle, diis system could also deal widi die issue of sinks of greenhouse gases by allowing producers of sinks (land-use changes, tree planting and so fordi) to be awarded permits for dieir activities diat diey can dien sell into die permit market. There are serious issues of measurement diat need to be overcome to ensure that the system is not debased; but in principle a generalised McKibbin-Wilcoxen sys tem would be possible and would be more feasible in each domestic system dian at die global system because of differential measurement of sinks across countries (though it is not be considered in diis article).
The McKibbin-Wilcoxen proposal as extended here has a number of advan tages. First, die same price will be charged for each new permit in each country as well as for any permits diat are traded in domestic permit markets. Thus, die mar ginal cost of reducing carbon emissions will be equalised widiin and across all coun tries diat participate. This makes the system efficient because die cheapest emis sions reductions will be undertaken first. Environmentalists and engineers often argue that many low-cost options are available for reducing energy demand. If so, diese low-cost options will be exploited under diis policy, widiout needing to be specifically identified in advance by die government. On die household side, for example, die increase in energy prices will encourage households to demand more energy-efficient vehicles and appliances.
Second, die policy contains built-in mechanisms to encourage enforcement. Governments will have an incentive to monitor die system because diey will be able to collect revenue from selling permits. Firms will have an incentive to monitor one another because any cheating by one firm would put its competitors at a disadvan tage and would also affect die value of permits held by odier firms.
Third, die system is flexible and decentralised. New countries can join by set ting up dieir own permit systems and agreeing to charge die stipulated world price for additional permits.
Fourdi, transfers associated widi die permit system are largely between firms or between firms and households, radier dian between die private sector and die gov ernment. The proposal also minimises transfers across borders, avoiding serious economic and political problems. Unlike die experience of die 1970s, increases in energy prices under this policy would not lead to massive transfers of wealth be tween countries.
Fifth, die policy also could be revised easily as more information becomes avail able. After setting up die system and agreeing on die price of permits, pardcipadng countries could meet every five years to evaluate die extent to which carbon emis sions have been abated as well as to re-evaluate die extent of climate change and its consequences. If it becomes clear diat more acdon is required, the permit price could be raised. If climate change turns out to be less serious than it appears today, die permit price could be lowered. To minimise die costs of these price changes, future markets could be developed in permits so that risks are effecdvely shared.
Sixdi, if any country decided to renege on its commitments, diis would only mean emissions globally would be higher dian odierwise, but the value of permits in other countries widiin die system would not be undermined and the system could hang togedier as countries leave and enter die system.
Overall, the advantage of die McKibbin-Wilcoxen proposal for a domesdcally managed, but internationally coordinated, permit and fee system over die targets and dmetables approach of die Kyoto Protocol is simply diat it is far more practical. It is more likely to be ratified by key countries because it limits die cost of compli ance and does not require governments to commit diemselves to achieving a given target at any cost. It is more likely to be acceptable to developing countries because it is not a Western-controlled centralised system. It is transparent to households and firms globally because it spells out exacdy how die policy will work, radier dian specifying die target and leaving die policy undefined. It is more credible than a targets and timetables policy because it is not so draconian diat countries will be tempted to renege under extreme future scenarios, and because die revenue from selling additional permits will give governments an incentive to enforce die agree ment over time. Existing industry is less likely to oppose it because compensation is built into die system. Moreover, because it contains a mechanism for limiting eco nomic costs, die risk of setting ambitious emissions targets, which could significandy reduce economic growdi if abatement proves to be expensive, is eliminated. This would remove die single most important obstacle to reaching a realistic international climate policy.
Most important, our system explicidy deals widi die uncertain nature of the cli mate change problem and allows plenty of flexibility when new information emerges on die costs of abatement, changes in climate and new developments in climate sci ence. It is also more likely to survive die political uncertainties of changing country commitments over time.
What Should Australia Do Now?
Australian policy-makers now face a dilemma. They have signed a Protocol which is subject to a great deal of uncertainty about ratification by key countries. A meaningful agreement hinges on how developing countries are included and this will become clearer in Argentina in November 1998 widi the fourth meeting of the Conference of die Parties to die Framework Convention. If the Kyoto Protocol does proceed, action will need to be initiated in Australia because, despite beliefs to the contrary, Australia has a good deal of abatement to be implemented by 2008. My research suggests that carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use will reach 150 per cent of 1990 levels by 2010, using plausible assumptions (widi a great deal of uncertainty around this number in bodi directions). Adding other sources of emissions complicates die actual emission calculation, and incorporating sinks fur ther complicates die extent of adjustment required. Nonedieless, Australia's target of 108 per cent of 1990 levels by between 2008 and 2012 will potendally require significant policy changes.
If Australia is to pardcipate in an international agreement like die Kyoto Proto col, acdon should start as soon as possible, but alter die Protocol is radfied by die US. This is pardcularly important for industries diat need to make long-term in vestment decisions. In die meantime, Australia should lobby die international community to move away from die fixed targets approach enshrined at Kyoto to wards action based on permit trading widi a fixed low price. The proposal for a fixed-price scheme set out here could be made consistent widi die Framework Con vention on Climate Change. There could be a clear statement diat die goal of the policy is a reduction in emissions. To achieve diis, every five years countries would meet to consider die success of die permit trading schemes in reducing global emissions and dien negotiate a price for permits diat would lead to convergence of emissions towards die stated goal. This learning by doing approach to international policies is a far more sensible way to proceed.
There is already considerable interest in die McKibbin-Wilcoxen proposal (or variations of it) at die international level, aldiough most negotiators argue diat it is currendy infeasible to change direction so fundamentally in view of die current state of negotiations.
II die Kyoto Protocol is ratified by die US, and die world continues to use rigid targets, it would be sensible for Australia to start a domestic permit trading system. This would place it in a good position if and when an international permit trade system is implemented. There is, however, a serious problem that should be con sidered. For carbon emissions alone, we estimate diat marginal abatement costs for Australia are high and certainly higher dian for the US. Thus, die price of permits in an Australian domestic system would be expected to be much higher than die price in a system diat included die US, which has low estimated marginal abatement costs, or even one diat included Russia, which would bring a significant volume of essentially Tree' permits to die system. After all, if die prices of an Australian-only system and a wider group of countries were die same, a permit trading system would be unnecessary because diere would be no gains from trade across national borders! So a permit system widiin Australia widi a cap on permit quantities equal to the Kyoto emission targets could be a very bad idea in die near term because any subsequent participation in a multi-country system would most likely lead to a large fall in die permit price in the future. Why pay a high economic price in the short term? If Australia is seriously going to reduce greenhouse emissions, an alternative approach would be to introduce a McKibbin-Wilcoxen system in Australia with a very low fixed permit price of, say, A$5 a ton of carbon-equivalent emissions. Thus, the cost of abatement would be known and fixed for a period of several years. A low price with market-determined abatement would ensure less economic dis ruption than a market-determined price. The permit price could then be adjusted, either independently by Australia or as part of entering into a wider system with more countries.
Given die many uncertainties widi the current state of negotiations, die interna tional community may yet adopt die global system consistent widi our proposal for a decentralised fixed-price permit trading system. It would be sensible to imple ment diis in Australia sooner radier than later. Even if die international community condnues to move towards a muld-country system widi a fixed target for emissions, diere is a strong case for implementing a fixed-price permit system in Australia in die short run. A domesdc fixed-price system widi a low inidal price would minimise the costs to Australia during die transidon from a domesdc permit system to a global permit system.
Summary
The Kyoto Protocol is a bad outcome for global environmental policy. It has cre ated a great deal of uncertainty about how and whedier countries are going to achieve by 2008-12 die strict quandty targets diat have been set. The intemadonal community had an opportunity to implement a credible instruments-based ap proach dial would begin to reduce emissions at low cost wherever possible, in addidon to giving flexibility to die dme frame and burden-sharing arrangements. Policy makers now have to turn to economic instruments widiin a target regime diat has many potential risks.
For researchers of climate change and for negotiators and bureaucrats, Kyoto was a full-employment contract for many years to come. For die world economy, it has presented many crucial challenges. Our goal should be to make die system diat develops as decentralised as possible and to ensure diat Australia does not commit to a significant loss in economic well-being while waiting for die odier key countries to participate. If greenhouse gas emission reductions are to be pursued -and diis will need to start soon if Australia is serious about die Kyoto Protocol -one way forward is a domestic version of die McKibbin-Wilcoxen proposal oudined in diis article. In diis case, a tradeable permit system could be implemented widiin Aus tralia but with a very low fixed price for permits. The initial allocation of permits could be die Kyoto target. The market would then be used to determine die extent of abatement at a known cost. This begins die greenhouse reduction process at die same time as keeping costs low until die outcome of a decade of future negotiations is realised.
